Mutual Indwelling by Cotnoir, A.J.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 34 Issue 2 Article 1 
4-1-2017 
Mutual Indwelling 
A.J. Cotnoir 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Cotnoir, A.J. (2017) "Mutual Indwelling," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 34 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol34/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
MUTUAL INDWELLING
A. J. Cotnoir
Perichoresis, or “mutual indwelling,” is a crucial concept in Trinitarian the-
ology. But the philosophical underpinnings of the concept are puzzling. 
According to ordinary conceptions of “indwelling” or “being in,” it is inco-
herent to think that two entities could be in each other. In this paper, I propose 
a mereological way of understanding “being in,” by analogy with standard 
examples in contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this proposal does not 
conflict with the doctrine of divine simplicity, but instead affirms it. I con-
clude by discussing how mutual indwelling relates to the concepts of unity 
(modal inseparability) and identity (qualitative indiscernibility).
Perichoresis—sometimes translated “co-inherence” or “mutual in-
dwelling”—is an important concept in Christian theology, central to many 
historical and contemporary understandings of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
The persons of the Trinity are said to indwell one another, and this in-
dwelling constitutes an intimate relationship between them. Perichoresis 
is used in different theological frameworks to ground various other aspects 
of the doctrine of the Trinity, such as the unity or oneness of the Trinity 
or the communication of attributes between the divine persons. This no-
tion of interpenetration or mutual indwelling can seem confusing or even 
perhaps paradoxical, but I will suggest that a mereological understanding 
of this concept can serve to illuminate perichoresis. To be more precise: I 
argue that the relation of mutual parthood can provide a coherent model 
of mutual indwelling of the persons on the Trinity.
The concept of mutual indwelling has its roots in the biblical texts, pri-
marily in the Gospel of John, where Jesus is quoted saying, “You may 
know and understand that the Father is in me, and I in the Father” (John 
10:38). Similarly, Jesus requests in John 10:9–11, “Believe me when I say 
that I am in the Father and the Father is in me.”
Following others,1 we may distinguish two versions of the concept: 
person-perichoresis and nature-perichoresis. Person-perichoresis regards the 
perichoretic relation(s) that holds within the Trinity between the three 
persons (Father, Son, and Spirit). Nature-perichoresis regards the peri-
choretic relation that holds within the hypostatic union between the two 
natures (human and divine) of the incarnate Son.
1Swinburne, The Christian God, 209n20; Crisp, “Problems with Perichoresis,” 121.
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As Crisp (following Prestige2 [1928] and others) notes, perichoresis was 
first used by Gregory of Nazianzen in the fourth century A.D., followed by 
Maximus the Confessor.3 It wasn’t until John of Damascus in the seventh 
century A.D. that the concept was applied to the Trinity alongside the no-
tion of “interpenetration.”4 By the time of the Council of Florence in 1441 
A.D. person-perichoresis had been fully incorporated into orthodoxy:
Because of this unity the Father is wholly in the Son and wholly in the Holy 
Ghost, the Son is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Holy Ghost, the 
Holy Ghost is wholly in the Father and wholly in the Son.5
But the concept of mutual indwelling is intuitively puzzling. According 
to all the usual ways of conceiving of “indwelling” or “being in,” it seems 
conceptually incoherent to think that two persons could be in each other. 
If I am in my house, then my house is not in me. This just seems to be 
a fact about the metaphysics of being in. The puzzling nature of mutual 
indwelling was already made plain in the mid-fourth century A.D. by 
Hilary of Poitiers who writes:
[It] confuse[s] many minds, and not unnaturally, for the powers of human 
reason cannot provide them with any intelligible meaning. It seems impos-
sible that one object should be both within and without another, or that 
. . . these Beings can reciprocally contain One Another, so that One should 
permanently envelope, and also be permanently enveloped by, the Other, 
whom yet He envelopes. . . . We must think for ourselves, and come to know 
the meaning of the words, “I in the Father, and the Father in Me”: but this 
will depend upon our success in grasping the truth that reasoning based 
upon Divine verities can establish its conclusions, even though they seem to 
contradict the laws of the universe.6
The underlying conception does seem impossible, contradicting the meta-
physical principles of the universe. And yet despite its widespread use in 
theology (perhaps even its overuse7), the concept of mutual indwelling 
has received comparatively little philosophical attention;8 and the puzzle 
regarding its conceptual coherence is rarely examined.9 But without such 
2Prestige, “ΠEPIXΩPEΩ AND ΠEPIXΩPHΣIΣ in the Fathers.”
3Crisp, “Problems with Perichoresis,” 121–123.
4See Twombly, Perichoresis and Personhood, for a full examination of John of Damascus on 
perichoresis.
5Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 71.
6Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, iii, 1, in Schaff and Wace Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 
Vol. 9, 234.
7Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection”; Otto, “The Use and Abuse of Perichoresis.”
8The concept has seen use in philosophical theorizing on the Trinity (e.g., Davis, “Peri-
choretic Monotheism”; Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology; Hasker, Metaphysics and the 
Tri-Personal God, ch. 25; Williams, “Neither Confounding the Persons nor Dividing the Sub-
stance”), but almost nothing by the way of analysis.
9The situation leads Tuggy to complain:
But one suspects that all proponents mean by perichoresis in this context is “what-
ever it is which makes divine persons combine to make a further person.” Even 
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analysis, there is the real danger that an important theological concept 
be rejected as unintelligible, or perhaps dismissed as “divine mystery.”10 
But even the greatest and most difficult divine mysteries (e.g., the Trinity 
or the hypostatic union) have been subject to unending philosophical 
analysis. We can and should agree with Crisp11 that trying to better un-
derstand mutual indwelling is a worthwhile enterprise, even if a complete 
understanding is “forever beyond us.”12
This article is an attempt to alleviate some of the puzzlement; I argue 
that a current formal theory of an ordinary conception of “being in” allows 
for mutual indwelling. In §I, I examine a range of possible proposals for 
modeling the perichoretic relationship, arguing that they will not succeed. 
In §II, I suggest a mereological way of understanding “being in,” by analogy 
with independently motivated examples in contemporary metaphysics. 
Because I am understanding perichoresis as a kind of parthood, it is crucial 
to show how such an understanding relates to the doctrine of divine sim-
plicity. In §III, I argue that this proposal does not conflict with simplicity, 
surprisingly, but instead affirms it. I conclude in §IV, by discussing how 
mutual indwelling relates to the concepts of unity (inseparability) and 
identity (indiscernibility).
I. Varieties of “Being In”
Several different philosophically robust concepts of “being in” are avail-
able. I want to distinguish two main groups: the predicational concepts and 
the containment concepts. Firstly, for the class of predicational concepts, the 
relata of “being in” are objects on the one hand and entities of a higher 
ontological category on the other. A paradigm case is the instantiation 
relation holding between an object and a property. This is a kind of “being 
in,” as when an attribute is “present in” the object it is true of. There is 
also the taxonomical relation of kind-membership, as when something 
is “one of” or “among” the s, for some suitable kind F. Similarly, there is 
the relational “in,” as when a two people are said to be “in love” or “in 
a marriage” by virtue of each of them bearing the appropriate relation 
to one another. Secondly, there is a class of containment concepts. Para-
digm examples of a containment concepts are set-theoretic such as “being 
a member of,” or “being a proper subset of.” Similarly, we have plural 
if it is true that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit “metaphysically interpenetrate” 
(whatever this means) . . . such metaphors simply hide an unintelligible claim. 
(Tuggy, “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,” 170–171)
10Hilary of Poitiers seemed to think philosophical reflection would not be of any help:
This is a problem which the wit of man will never solve, nor will human research 
ever find an analogy for this condition of Divine existence. But what man cannot 
understand, God can be. I do not mean to say that the fact that this is an assertion 
made by God renders it at once intelligible to us. (De Trinitate, iii, 1, in Schaff and 
Wace, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 9, 234)
11Crisp, “Problems with Perichoresis,” 120.
12van Inwagen, “And yet There Are Not Three Gods but One God,” 243.
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locutions of “being one of” or “being a member of” a plurality of objects, 
as when I refer to “one of my children” or “a member of the Beatles.” Per-
haps most centrally, we have locational concepts of “being in,” involving 
an entity’s spatial location. Finally, there is also the mereological concept 
of containment, namely parthood, as when an object is in another by 
being a part of it.
One may attempt to understand perichoresis in terms of predicational 
conceptions of “being in.” I won’t have much to say against such attempts 
as the main aim of this paper is to explore to what extent we can make 
sense of mutual indwelling in terms of containment conceptions of “being 
in.” But here is a reason to be dissatisfied with the predication concep-
tions. It is initially plausible that the person-perichoretic relation should 
be understood as holding between the persons of the Trinity, who are 
themselves of the same ontological category. Predicational conceptions 
of “being in,” however, are always trans-categorical—they hold between 
entities of different ontological type.13 And this rules out a straightforward 
application of instantiation or kind-membership.14 That is, the persons are 
said to be in each other, they are not both (individually) “in F” for some 
property or kind F. Similar considerations tell against the relational “in”: 
it is by virtue of some relation R between the persons (e.g., Heloise loving 
Abelard and Abelard loving Heloise) that we say they (jointly) are “in 
R” (e.g., “Heloise and Abelard are in love” or “Heloise is in love with 
Abelard” etc.).15 As a result, the relevant sort of “being in” would not a 
relation between the persons, but rather it would be relation between the 
persons and a some relation in a higher ontological category.
None of this is dispositive against predicational concepts;16 but I think 
it does provide a pro tanto motivation for exploring containment concep-
tions thoroughly.
In the remainder of this section, I consider each of the containment 
conceptions of “being in” that are best understood; indeed, each has a 
formally precise theoretical foundation. I begin by arguing against set-
theoretic and plural conceptions. I then consider the locational conception. 
13This is clear enough when we are dealing with first-order entities like objects or persons 
and their properties which are second-order; and this is all that really matters for the point 
being made here. Things are a little more contentious when we are dealing with higher-
level entities like properties and propositions, which presumably can themselves can have 
properties. The standard view is that any properties of second-order properties must be 
third-order, and so of a different ontological kind. But of course the standard view might be 
rejected.
14But see §IV.
15Linguistically speaking, the prepositional “in” typically requires the nominalization of 
the given relation to serve as its complement. But this should not be taken to mean this sort 
of “being in’” is a relation between first-order objects.
16One might, for example, put forward a relational view according to which Jesus is “in 
union with” the Father and the Father is “in union with” the Son. Here the relevant R is the 
perichoretic relation of unity itself, and the apparent symmetry of “being in” is explained 
away. I will not explore this proposal further; as my aim in this paper is to take the symmetry 
of “being in” seriously.
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Finally, I settle on the mereological conception as my key point of depar-
ture. I will argue that there is a viable philosophical theory of parthood, 
complete with a coherent and consistent formalization, that allows for 
mutual parts—distinct entities that are parts of each other. Such a view can 
make sense of a perichoretic relation according to which it is absolutely 
coherent to affirm that the three persons of the Trinity are “in” the others.
Containment
Set theory is the paradigm case of formally developed conception of 
“being in.” Sets are abstract (mathematical) collections which have mem-
bers or elements; elements of a set are in sets by virtue of the membership 
relation. Pure sets have nothing but other sets among their members, or 
their members’ members, etc. These are purely abstract. Impure sets can 
contain concrete objects (called urelements) as members. Though they con-
tain concrete urelements, impure sets are still abstract.
This fact is a problem for modeling mutual indwelling: sets are abstract 
objects even when its members are concrete. In the case of perichoresis, to 
model the claim that each person of the Trinity is in the others, we would 
need to have it each person is an abstract object in order to be capable of 
having members. But this would (should!) be objectionable to those who 
think God is a concrete (even if non-material) entity.17 Of course, it is not 
unusual for the purposes of model theory to use set-theoretic entities and 
relations to represent concrete entities and relations; but for our purposes 
(i.e., the philosophical explication of a puzzling concept) the explanatory 
value of doing so seems dubious.18
The second main containment conception of “being in” is found in 
plural logic. Pluralities are somewhat like sets; they are governed by a 
membership relation “is one of”: when x is one of the X s we can think of x 
as being contained in the X s (e.g., Ringo is one of the Beatles). There are a 
couple of main differences between sets and pluralities: firstly, pluralities 
are thought to be concrete when their members are. So for our purposes, 
pluralities avoid the main problem with sets. Secondly, pluralities are 
17See Leftow, “Is God an Abstract Object?,” for related discussion, albeit aimed at views 
in which essences are abstracta and God is identical to God’s essence.
18In any case, there are other difficulties. The membership relation of Zermelo-Frankel 
set theory (ZF) is not a good model for “being in” because of the axiom of foundation which 
entails that there can be no cycles or loops in the set membership relation. (See, e.g., 
Theorem 7X in Enderton, Elements of Set Theory, 206.) Crucially it cannot be that X is in 
Y and Y is in X for any sets X and Y. ZF and its descendants are not the only set theories, 
however. There are a number of set theories in which the axiom of foundation fails. Non-
wellfounded set theories or hyperset theories replace the axiom of foundation with variations 
of an Anti-Foundation Axiom which force there to be sets whose membership relation cycles 
back on itself (Barwise and Moss, Vicious Circles). For example, sets like A = {B} and B = {A} 
are perfectly consistent (Aczel, Non-Well-Founded Sets). Non-wellfounded set theories might 
provide a formal setting amenable to modeling a perichoretic relation of “being in”—it may 
even show that there is a coherent notion of “being in” that allows for mutual indwelling. 
But given their exotic character and the lack of philosophical familiarity, doing so would 
serve little explanatory use.
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thought to be multiplicities whereas sets are thought to be singular enti-
ties (e.g., my children are many; they are not some singular entity).
But this latter difference is also the main problem with plural under-
standings of mutual indwelling. The claim that Son is “one of” the Father 
will only be coherent on the assumption that the Father is a multiplicity—
that he is a plurality. That’s intuitively and theologically problematic, as 
the Father is an individual person.19 Moreover, the Father and the Son 
would both have to be multiplicities (because the indwelling is mutual), 
and hence the “is one of” relationship would not apply.20
The third main containment conception of “being in” can be found in 
logics of location.21 Theories of location analyze the relation that objects 
have to the spatio-temporal regions they occupy. Since regions may be 
contained in other regions, the objects that have those locations may “in-
herit” a kind of containment. So, one might define a relation of “being in” 
as follows: x is “in” y if and only if the location of x is a subregion of the 
location of y. This relation is perfectly compatible with mutual indwelling, 
since x is in y and y is in x merely implies that x and y have identical loca-
tions, not that x and y themselves are identical. So co-location could serve 
as a model of mutual indwelling.
This kind of containment solves the problems with previous notions; 
after all spatial containment relates one concrete object to another. However, 
if applied as a model of perichoresis, it commits us to certain requirements 
on the locations of the persons of the Trinity that are controversial. At a 
minimum, it requires that the persons of the Trinity have spatial locations, 
which raises a host of controversial issues about God’s relation to space-
time. For example, Hasker claims the divine persons cannot be co-located 
because God is non-spatial.22 By contrast, traditional considerations sur-
rounding God’s omnipresence can yield further conflicts.23
19Perhaps, one could attempt to avoid this by arguing that each person of the Trinity is 
both one and many. In fact, some who endorse plural logic also argue additionally for many-
one identities (see Cotnoir and Baxter, Composition as Identity). Many-one identity might 
seem to be precisely the sort of view Trinitarians need (as argued by Bohn, “The Logic of 
the Trinity”), but it leads to unorthodox claims like “there is one God and many Gods” (see 
Kleinschmidt, “Many-One Identity and the Trinity,” for compelling arguments against this 
view). In any case, it seems as though we should be able to model perichoresis without being 
forced to the view that each person is a multiplicity.
20Of course we can generalize the one-many “is one of” relation to a many-many “are 
among” relation defined as follows: the Xs are among the Ys iff every member of the Xs is a 
member of the Ys (e.g., my children are among the schoolchildren). But this still won’t allow 
mutual amongness since the “among” relation between pluralities is standardly thought 
to be antisymmetric: if the Xs are among the Ys and Ys and then Ys are among the Xs then 
Xs = Ys. That’s because, like sets, pluralities are individuated extensionally: the Xs and Ys are 
identical whenever they have exactly the same members.
21Parsons, “Theories of Location”; Casati and Varzi, Parts and Places.
22Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 242.
23Inman, “Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial.”
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Mereology
To sum up, we are after a kind of “being in” relation such that the relata are 
neither abstracta nor multiplicities. We want a containment relation which 
holds between a concrete object and another unitary concrete object, and 
which doesn’t require spatial locations for these objects. Fortunately, there 
is a formal theory of just such a relation—mereology.
Mereology is the formal theory of parts and wholes; it aims at a precise 
account of the parthood relation. Here “parthood” is to be understood as 
the general relation holding between entities and their components, no 
matter what sort of things they are. For example, the keyboard is part of 
my computer, my fingers are parts of my hands which are parts of me, the 
number 2 is part of the function 2x + 3. So, the relata of parthood can be 
either concrete or abstract.
There are a number of mereological theories in the literature, but ac-
cording to so-called “classical mereology,” the parthood relation is what 
is known as a partial order. That is, the axioms of this theory (typically) 
contain the following three principles governing parthood:24
Reflexivity: For all x, x is part of x.
Antisymmetry: For all x and y, if x is part of y and y is part of x, then x 
and y are identical.
Transitivity: For all x, y, and z, if x is part of y and y part of z, then x is 
part of z.
Here I have followed standard procedure using “parthood” as a relation 
that allows for identity to be a limit case. The strict notion, incompatible 
with identity, is called “proper parthood.” Pretty clearly, antisymmetry 
rules out mutual indwelling between distinct entities; it forces parthood 
to be asymmetric in a way that is compatible with only the symmetries of 
identity.
Recently, however, the antisymmetry of parthood has come under fire. 
Philosophers have put forward a number of purported counterexamples. 
Consider the Aleph, a strange object found in the basement of Beatriz 
Viterbo’s house in Borges’s story:
I saw the Aleph from all points. I saw the earth in the Aleph and in the earth 
the Aleph once more and the earth in the Aleph.25
Sanford mentions this case to suggest that the naïve notion of parthood 
does not require antisymmetry.26 As he notes, Borges uses the “in” of 
containment and suggests that whatever the Aleph contains is part of it. 
24Of course there are other axioms too. I say “typically” only because there are different 
axiomatizations of classical mereology, some of which have these principles as theorems.
25Borges, “El Aleph,” 151.
26Sanford, “The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naïve Mere-
ology.”
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Consider also a passage in the Upanishads that outlines the structural rela-
tions between Brahman and persons:
In the center of the castle of Brahman, our own body, there is a small shrine 
in the form of a lotus-flower, and within can be found a small space. . . . This 
little space within the heart is as great as this vast universe. The heavens and 
earth are there, and the sun, and the moon, and the stars; fire and lightning 
and winds are there; and all that now is and all that is not; for the whole 
universe is in Him and He dwells within our heart.27
Other examples can be found in the from the Huayan school of Chinese 
Buddhism such as the “Net of Indra”—a net of jewels that stretches in-
finitely in every direction, but in which each jewel is contained in every 
other, symbolizing the interconnectedness of the universe.28
In the recent philosophical literature, a structurally similar example has 
been put forward by Tillman and Fowler.
Suppose that the universe exists . . . a thing such that absolutely everything 
is a part of it. . . . Assuming there is a unique such thing, let’s name it U. Ac-
cording to a popular view of semantic content, “U exists” semantically en-
codes a singular, structured proposition that has U itself as a constituent as 
well as the property of existing. By hypothesis, this proposition is a proper 
part of U. But U is in turn a proper part of the relevant proposition.29
Tillman and Fowler take this as evidence that parthood must fail to be 
antisymmetric, a point made also by Yablo.30
A final example involves a time-travel case from Kleinschmidt.31 Clifford 
is a dog-shaped statue which was made partly of other statues, including 
Kibble—a small statue of a biscuit. But Kibble, too, is made partly of other 
statues, including a time-traveling future version of Clifford himself, suit-
ably reduced in size. As a result, it would seem as though Kibble is a part 
of Clifford and has Clifford as a part.
All of the above examples are somewhat exotic, requiring some du-
bitable metaphysical assumptions (the possibility of time travel, the 
structured view of propositions with constituents as parts). But it should 
be clear that some philosophers have rejected the “classical” view that 
parthood is a partial order. In the next section, I will claim that in fact 
there are many perfectly ordinary cases of parthood that fail to validate 
27Chandogya Upanishad, §8.1, in Mascaró, The Upanishads, 120.
28See Jones, “Mereological Heuristics for Huayan Buddhism”; Priest, One, ch. 11.
29Tillman and Fowler, “Propositions and Parthood,” 525.
30Yablo, “Parts and Differences,” 143. Similar cases regarding parts of propositions are 
discussed in Cotnoir, “Strange Parts”; Gilmore, “Parts of Propositions”; and Merricks, Propo-
sitions, 166–167.
31Kleinschmidt, “Multilocation and Mereology.” Similar cases have been proposed 
and discussed in Daniels, “Occupy Wall”; Eagle, “Location and Perdurance”; Effingham, 
“Mereological Explanation and Time Travel”; Effingham and Robson, “A Mereological 
Challenge to Endurantism”; Gilmore, “Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Perdurance” 
and “Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties”; and Smith, “Mereology without Weak 
Supplementation.”
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antisymmetry. Indeed, there are viable mereological theories that do not 
contain antisymmetry as an axiom or theorem.
II. An Analogy: The Statue and the Clay
To explain how a theory of parthood could allow for ordinary cases of 
mutual parts, I want to draw on a standard example from contemporary 
metaphysics: the statue and the clay it is made from. One major view 
among metaphysicians is that the statue and the clay are distinct entities 
by virtue of their being discernible from one another. By “distinct” here, 
I mean non-identical, where identity is to be understood in the standard 
first-order sense. That is, identity is the unique reflexive, transitive, and 
symmetric relation that satisfies the Indiscernibility of Identicals:
Indiscernibility of Identicals: For all (qualitative) properties F, if x is iden-
tical to y, then Fx if and only if Fy.
The clay and the statue are frequently thought to be discernible: for ex-
ample, the clay but not the statue can survive squashing; the statue might 
be Romanesque, whereas the clay is not; the statue might be badly made 
where as the clay is not; the clay may be of poor quality but the statue 
might be of very high quality, etc.32 So we may conclude that they are 
non-identical.33
But though they are distinct, they still are completely spatially coin-
cident and are made of the same material parts. This conflicts with the 
controversial criterion for the identity of objects called mereological exten-
sionality according to which any two composite objects with all the same 
proper parts are identical.
Classical mereology is extensional in precisely this way; it stipulates 
that objects are individuated by their parts. If two objects are mereologi-
cally equivalent, then they are identical. As a result, classical mereology 
forces on us the conclusion that objects which are mereologically indis-
cernible are indiscernible tout court. That is a strong conclusion, indeed.
There are however formal mereologies in the recent literature which 
reject extensionality, and they have recently been gaining traction.
Two Kinds of Non-Extensional Mereology
Non-extensional mereologies fall into two kinds. The first are unsuppple-
mented mereologies, which reject supplementation principles like the 
following:34
32See, e.g., Johnston, “Constitution is not Identity” and Fine, “The Non-Identity of a Ma-
terial Thing and its Matter.” For an overview of such arguments, and relevant references, 
see Wasserman, “Material Constitution”; Magidor, “Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Meta-
physics”; Paul, “The Puzzles of Material Constitution”; and Blatti, “Material Constitution.”
33Whether such properties that discern the statue and clay are themselves qualitative is 
controversial.
34See, e.g., Gilmore, “Quasi-Supplementation, Plenitudinous Coincidentalism, and Gunk.”
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Weak Supplementation: If x is a proper part of y, there is some part of y 
that is disjoint from x.
(Here, by “disjoint” I mean that they do not overlap, i.e., the two objects 
have no parts in common.) This principle gives voice to the intuitive 
thought that if an object has a proper part it should also have some 
other part, particularly one which does share any parts with the other. 
Supplementation principles are extremely plausible, and play a number 
of important roles in formal mereology.
The second kind of non-extensional mereology are mutual parts mere-
ologies; they reject the antisymmetry principle for parthood. On such a 
view, the statue and the clay, though distinct, are part of each other. This 
view was first defended by Thomson35 and more recently by me.36 The 
statue and the clay, and any other cases of mereologically coincident ob-
jects, are perfectly ordinary, non-exotic cases of mutual parthood.
Given the antecedent plausibility of non-extensionalism, it is worth 
taking the time to make the case that mutual parts mereologies have 
advantages over unsupplemented mereologies for this purpose. Sider ar-
gues that if the statue and its matter share the same parts then they must 
be mutual parts.37 His argument relies on another mereological principle, 
called Strong Supplementation.
Strong Supplementation: If x is not part of y, there is some part of x that 
is disjoint from y.
Since the statue and its clay share all their parts in common, there cannot 
be a part of one that does not overlap the other, and hence by (the contra-
positive of) the above principle, both are parts of one another.
Recently, other arguments have been put forward in favor of mutual 
parthood anti-extensional mereology. In past work I’ve put forward a 
number of arguments against unsupplemented mereologies by outlining 
the key roles supplementation principles play in formal theories of mere-
ology, in addition to arguing that a mutual parts mereology is the best 
anti-extensional mereology compatible with universalism.38
There is a sense in which antisymmetry just is an extensionality prin-
ciple for parthood. Compare three main forms of extensionality:
Extensionality of Proper Parthood: If x and y are composite objects with all 
and only the same proper parts, then x = y.
Extensionality of Overlap: If x and y overlap all and only the same things, 
then x = y.
35Thomson, “Parthood and Identity Across Time” and “The Statue and the Clay.”
36Cotnoir, “Anti-Symmetry and Non-Extensional Mereology.”
37Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 155.
38Cotnoir, “Does Universalism Entail Extensionalism?”
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Extensionality of Parthood: If x and y have all and only the same parts, 
then x = y.
All such principles assert an identity between objects that share certain 
mereological properties. Antisymmetry has the same form, asserting an 
identity between mutual parts. In fact, if a is part of b and b is part of a, 
by transitivity we know that every part of a is part of b and vice versa. 
Hence, in the presence of transitivity, antisymmetry is equivalent to the 
extensionality of parthood.
In short, anyone who is sympathetic to non-extensionalism for material 
objects ought to take mutual parthood mereology as a serious contender. 
And since parthood is one sort of containment relation between objects 
(including concrete objects), it is a good candidate for modeling mutual 
indwelling.
A Formal Theory of Mutual Indwelling
Here then is an axiomatization of a mereology that allows for mutual part-
hood.
Reflexivity: For all x, x is part of x.
Transitivity: For all x, y, and z, if x is part of y and y is part of z, then x 
is part of z.
Strong Supplementation: If x is not part of y, then there is some that is 
part of x that is disjoint from y.
Composition: For any X s if φ holds of the X s then there is some z such 
that z is a fusion of the X s.
The final axiom of Composition is included for completeness since mereo-
logical theories typically include axioms that characterize conditions 
under which composition occurs. Here, I have simply used a schema, 
where φ here can be any condition one likes: e.g., if φ is just the condition 
that there is at least one of the X s then the result will be mereological 
universalism, or φ might be the more restrictive condition that the X s are 
structured in a certain way, etc. Also, z is a fusion of the X s” means “for all 
y, y overlaps z if and only if y overlaps one of the X s.”
This theory has many models that allow for mutual parthood. We can 
draw these models using directed graphs, with letters at each node repre-
senting an object and arrows representing the parthood relation. (Chaining 
together arrows also counts as an instance of parthood.) A model of the 
statue and the clay, for example, might look like this:
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Here a and b are the statue and clay respectively, and c and d parts of 
both.39
Here is another model, this time of three objects, all of which are mu-
tual parts of one another:
This last model is particularly salient for our purposes, since it purports 
to have the structure of the perichoretic relations between the persons of 
the Trinity. In each case, every person is part of another person who is in 
turn part of the first. We can see that every person is a mutual part of every 
other person of the Trinity.
These models show that the formal system is logically consistent; there 
is nothing contradictory about a relation that satisfies these axioms. And 
insofar as we are willing to accept that this axiomatic system represents a 
kind of containment conception of “being in,” we have shown that mutual 
“being in” is formally coherent.
III. Divine Simplicity
In modeling perichoresis as a kind of parthood relation, the proposal 
would seem to run the risk of conflicting with the long-standing albeit 
controversial doctrine of divine simplicity. In this section I will outline six 
different versions of the doctrine of simplicity, and address each of them 
in turn. I’ll argue that on each construal, God can be considered to be 
simple even if we accept the mutual parthood model of perichoresis.
The doctrine of divine simplicity has too long of a history to outline 
here. Its foremost recent critic is Plantinga.40 But the doctrine also has 
many recent proponents.41 There are a number of different things one 
might mean by this doctrine, however. Consider:
(1) God is simple by virtue of being immaterial; he has no material 
parts.
(2) God is simple by virtue of transcending spacetime; he has no spa-
tial or temporal parts.
39For convenience we are leaving aside the obvious possibility that c and d have other 
parts.
40Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (See also Mullins, “Simply Impossible” and Schmitt, 
“The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity”).
41Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”; Davies, “A Modern Defence of Divine 
Simplicity”; Dolezal, God without Parts; Leftow, “Divine Simplicity.”
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(3) God is simple by virtue of being identical to his attributes; he has 
no formal or qualitative parts.
(4) God is simple by virtue of being undivided; his divinity is not split 
between the divine persons.
(5) God is simple by virtue of being independent; he is not composed 
of anything more fundamental than himself.
(6) God is simple by virtue of having no (proper) parts of any sort.
Each of these doctrines are distinct, with (6) being the most general for-
mulation. I want to argue that all of them may be affirmed by those who 
accept our model.
Starting with (1), note that in modeling perichoresis as a parthood rela-
tion I have not made any assumption that God is made of matter nor that 
the parthood relation is restricted only to material objects. Regarding (2), 
given that I have not analyzed parthood in terms of spatial or temporal re-
lations, there is no assumption here that God has spatial or temporal parts. 
Of course, spatial intuitions often drive judgements about “containment” 
or “being in,” but it needn’t be so (compare the examples in §I). Nothing 
about this analysis entails that all parts must be located in spacetime, and 
so there is no reason to think the view violates simplicity of type (2).
As for (3), we come to the most controversial doctrine of simplicity: 
God’s identity with his attributes. This version of simplicity is based 
on a background constituent ontology according to which attributes are 
themselves parts of the concrete particulars that instantiate them. Con-
trast relational ontology according to which attributes are not parts of the 
concrete things that instantiate them.42 If a constituent ontologist were to 
accept that God’s attributes are distinct from himself (or from one another) 
then God would have distinct parts and hence would be metaphysically 
complex, violating simplicity. Relational ontologists can quite happily ac-
cept that God has no formal or qualitative parts, as they already accept 
that nothing concrete has such parts.43 As far as I can see, nothing about 
modeling perichoresis as a kind of parthood conflicts with (3), and so I 
will leave this thorny issue aside.
Now we turn to (4)–(6), the versions of divine simplicity that most di-
rectly threaten the current proposal. I will address each question in turn.
Distinction without Division
The question raised by (4) is whether God is rightly thought to be divided 
or partitioned into the divine persons; the answer within classical theology 
42The connection between constituent and relational ontologies and the doctrine of 
simplicity was made first by Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity.” For more details on the meta-
physics, see van Inwagen, “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies.”
43This is not to say that relational ontologists don’t have any problems in giving an ac-
count of God’s attributes, but whatever those problems are, they are not mereological.
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has nearly always been in the negative. Consider the High Medieval theo-
logian Peter Lombard:
Nor is any of the three persons a part of God or of the divine essence, be-
cause each of them is truly and fully God and is the whole and full divine 
essence and so none of these persons is a part of the Trinity.44
The idea here is that each person of the Trinity should not be thought of 
as a part of God, since in the ordinary setting that would imply that each 
person of the Trinity is not wholly or fully God. This is intuitively cor-
rect, as it appeals to the thought that where there are proper parts, there is a 
remainder. (Recall this is the same natural thought that lies behind various 
supplementation principles.) God is not divided in this sense.
In modeling perichoresis as a kind of parthood, one might wonder 
whether I have run afoul of this idea. Although the model only claims 
that the three persons of the Trinity are parts of each other, we also want to 
affirm that each person is God. Does this mean that God is divided amongst 
the persons? No. After all, each person is itself “included in” every other 
person. When it is claimed that the Son is God, it is simply false that there 
are other parts of God not included within the Son. And this is precisely 
what our model of mutual indwelling secures. The Son is fully God and 
the fullness of God is “in” him; that is, the entirety of the Trinity dwells 
in him.
Here is another way of illustrating the point. Consider again the rel-
evant model of perichoresis:
Which of the elements of this model is composed of the others? The an-
swer is complicated by the fact that the composition relation here is not 
unique—that is, there are X s such that more than one thing that counts 
as being a fusion of the X s. In fact, since everything overlaps everything 
else in this model, every person counts as a “fusion” of every collection of 
persons. The Father is composed of the Father, Son, and Spirit; the Son is 
composed of the Father, Son, and Spirit; and the Spirit is composed of the 
Father, Son, and Spirit as well. Because they all mutually interpenetrate 
one another, they are each “composed” of all the others.
44Lombard, Sententiarum, I, xix, 5, in Lombard, The Sentences, vol. 1, 108.
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This situation should be sharply contrasted with another mereological 
model with three basic elements:
This model is strikingly different in that each of the three basic ele-
ments are composed into a fourth thing. That fusion is unique, and has 
each of its basic elements as proper parts. In this case, some fourth thing d 
is divided among three others a, b, c; in this case, because d has a as a proper 
part, there is some remainder of d that isn’t included in a. This is not the 
model of the persons of the Trinity I am proposing; let me emphasize—I 
am not proposing that God is composed of the three persons of the Trinity, 
each of which is a proper part of God. To mistake this model for the one 
above would be to misunderstand the main contention of this paper: the 
mereological relation of mutual parthood can provide a coherent model of 
perichoresis; the mereological relation of composition, however, does not 
account for the unity or oneness of God.
Dependence and Mutual Parthood
Now to the question raised in (5): is God composed of anything more fun-
damental than himself? Consider Anselm:
For, everything which is composite requires for its subsistence the things of 
which it is compounded, and, indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence, 
because, whatever it is, it is through these things.45
And Aquinas:46
On the contrary, every composite is posterior to its components: since the 
simpler exists in itself before anything is added to it for the composition of 
a third. But nothing is prior to the first. Therefore since God is the first prin-
ciple, He is not composite.47
The reasoning here regards God’s ontological priority over all other things. 
One of the main motivations for adhering to divine simplicity is aseity, 
45Anselm, Monologion, XVII.
46Compare Summa Theologiae 1.3.7: “Every composite thing is posterior to its components 
and dependent on them. But, as was shown above, God is the first being.”
47Aquinas, Scriptum super libros sententiarum I.8.4.1 in Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas’s Earliest 
Treatment of the Divine Essence, 9.
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the thought that God is not dependent on anything for his existence. It is 
frequently thought that composite objects are dependent on their parts for 
their existence. So God must be simple, lest he be dependent on his parts.48
This argument for simplicity depends, of course, on the independent 
premise that wholes depend or are grounded in their parts—a premise 
which has recently become extremely controversial. In recent metaphysics 
it has come under heavy attack on a number of independent grounds. 
Schaffer has put forward a number of arguments for priority monism—the 
view that the whole universe is ontologically prior to its many parts—on 
the basis of physical49 and metaphysical50 considerations. Priority monism 
is a radical inversion of the usual part-whole dependence order. But re-
cently it has been put in service of the doctrine of the Trinity to preserve 
aseity without simplicity.51
Rather than purely inverting the order of dependence, others have 
simply denied that dependence and parthood correlate at all. Some argue 
that wholes depend on their parts whilst other wholes are prior to their 
parts;52 others suggest that the dependence can run either up or down the 
mereological hierarchy depending on the kind of part it is.53 Johnston is 
explicit about the implications for divine simplicity:
In the tradition of Classical Theism, a paradoxical consequence has been 
drawn from this, namely that God is utterly simple, so that his essential 
attributes must all be identical, and be identical with him. . . . But these para-
doxical conclusions only follow given Thomas’s false assumption that every 
composite thing is posterior to its components, and dependent on them.54
So there is generally independent reason to doubt the crucial premise in 
the main argument for divine simplicity. A mereologically complex God 
need not be dependent on anything.
Such a defense is available to the view of mutual indwelling developed 
here. There are really two main options for those who accept a mutual 
parts mereology. The first is simply to deny that ontological dependence 
tracks mereological parthood. In fact, insofar as ontological dependence 
48See Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity” and Morris, “Dependence and Divine Simplicity” 
for more on the relation between the doctrines of divine simplicity and aseity.
49See also Calosi, “Quantum Mechanics and Priority Monism.”
50Schaffer, “Monism.” See also Cameron, “From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority 
Monism”; Esfeld, “Physicalism and Ontological Holism”; Morganti, “Ontological Priority, 
Fundamentality, and Monism”; and Trogdon, “Monism and Intrinsicality.”
51Fowler, “Simplicity or Priority.”
52See, e.g., Inman, Substantial Priority and McDaniel, The Fragmentation of Being, 212–213.
53See McDaniel’s (“Structure-Making”) discussion of Armstrong, and especially the neo-
Aristotelians, e.g., Fine (“Towards a Theory of Part,” § 9) and Johnston (“Hylomorphism,” 
§ 12) who think that wholes depend on their “constituent” or “structural” parts (like the 
mechanical parts of a motorcycle), but whose “decompositional” parts (like the Northern 
or Southern hemisphere) depend on the whole. See also Koons, “Staunch vs. Faint-Hearted 
Hylomorphism” and Marmodoro, “Aristotle’s Hylomorphism, without Reconditioning.”
54Johnston, “Hylomorphism,” 679.
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is a kind of metaphysical explanatory relation, we may have even more 
reason to be suspicious. Mutual parts would entail a cycle of metaphysical 
explanation—a whole grounded in a part that is grounded in that whole—
which may well be regarded as viciously circular.55
A second option would be simply to accept the correlation between 
parthood and ontological dependence, and simply accept that ontological 
dependence is not itself asymmetric (a principle which has itself recently 
become controversial56). If cases of mutual parthood are cases of sym-
metric dependence, one might well agree with Bliss57 and Thompson58 that 
symmetric dependence is not viciously circular. In the case of the Trinity, 
then, God would be a paradigm case of an ontologically interdependent 
entity without this violating God’s aseity. Everything that is not God is 
dependent on God, whilst God is not dependent on anything that is not 
God, even if there can be mutual interdependence within the Trinity.59
Evaluating the metaphysical and theological merits of each response 
is for another time (though I prefer the first on metaphysical grounds). If 
either is successful, though, there is no deep conflict between my model of 
mutual indwelling and the the aseity of God.
Two Definitions of Proper Parthood
Let us turn now to the more general doctrine of simplicity raised in 
(6)—the claim that God has no proper parts of any sort. (Since God is self-
identical he is an improper part of himself; so (6) must be phrased using 
the notion of proper parthood.) But how exactly should we understand 
proper parthood?
In mereology, there are two candidate definitions for proper parthood.
Proper Parthood 1 (PP1): x is a proper part of y iff x is part of y and x is 
not identical to y
Proper Parthood 2 (PP2): x is a proper part of y iff x is part of y and y is 
not part of x
While the former definition PP1 is presumably more common, many au-
thors have relied on the identity-free version PP2, following Goodman.60 
In classical mereology, the two definitions are equivalent: PP2 logically 
55Lowe, “Ontological Dependency.”
56See Barnes, “Symmetric Dependence” and Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Grounding is not a 
Strict Order.”
57Bliss, “Viciousness and Circles of Ground.”
58Thompson, “Metaphysical Interdependence.”
59Some language used in describing the relations between the persons of the Trinity like 
“begets” and “proceeds from” suggests dependence relations in the Trinity. I do not think of 
the divine processions in this way, but how such language relates to aseity and ontological 
dependence is beyond the scope of this paper.
60Goodman, The Structures of Appearance. Examples include Casati and Varzi, Parts and 
Places, 36; Eberle, Nominalistic Systems; Niebergall, “Calculi of Individuals and Some Exten-
sions,” 338; Niebergall, “Mereology,” 274; and Simons, “Free Part-Whole Theory,” 286.
140 Faith and Philosophy
entails PP1, but the converse entailment requires antisymmetry. So in the 
context of a mutual parts mereology the equivalence breaks down, and 
there are compelling reasons to prefer the second definition.
The first reason in favor of PP2 as the correct definition for proper 
parthood concerns the transitivity of proper parthood. Proper parthood 
should be transitive if parthood is, but this occurs only on PP2. PP1 allows 
violations of transitivity, as in the following countermodel:
If a is a proper part of b and b is a proper part of a, it will not follow that 
a is a proper part of a as that would contradict PP1.
A second reason to favor PP2 as the correct definition for proper part-
hood is that it, but not PP1, is compatible with Supplementation. Recall 
(from §II) that any object that has a proper part must have another part 
disjoint from the first. The principle is extremely intuitive; so natural in 
fact that many authors have gone so far as to call it analytically true.61 
But it would be false on the PP1 definition: the same countermodel as 
above can be used. If a and b are mutual parts, then a is a proper part of b 
on the PP1 definition. But by transitivity every part of b is a part of a and 
hence there can be no proper parts of b that do not overlap a. This sort of 
situation does not arise with PP2, however, since no mutual parts are ever 
proper parts on the PP2 definition.
This last fact is important, since according to the PP2 definition an en-
tity that has nothing but mutual parts will have no proper parts. To be 
a simple is to have no proper parts, and hence entities like a and b in the 
above model count as simples. The same holds true, of course, in the three-
element model of perichoresis. Each person has no proper parts (given the 
only plausible definition), hence each is mereologically simple.62
One might object: doesn’t this accommodation of divine simplicity 
undermine our original claims that the Father is in the Son and the Son 
61Varzi, “The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition,” 110) claims “this principle 
expresses a minimal requirement which any relation must satisfy . . . if it is to qualify as 
parthood at all.” Simons (Parts, 116) claims that “[Supplementation] is indeed analytic—con-
stitutive of the meaning of proper part.” Similar claims to analyticity are endorsed by Bohn 
(“An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition,” 27n3), Koslicki (The 
Structure of Objects, 167–168), and McDaniel (“Structure-Making,” 264).
62This raises the question of whether any person of the Trinity has any non-mutual parts; 
for example, an anonymous referee wondered whether the Son has his human nature as a 
proper part. As I think of natures as properties, and because I reject constituent ontology, the 
human nature of Jesus is not one of his parts. What about other material parts, e.g., the hands 
and feet of Jesus? These bodily parts should count as proper parts in the ordinary sense, but 
it’s not clear in general how material parthood relations within the body of Jesus as incarnate 
Son will integrate with claims about the Trinity. For example, we wouldn’t want to conclude 
that God has material parts from the claims that Jesus is God and Jesus had material parts. 
Nor will we want to conclude that God has proper parts mutatis mutandis. In any case, these 
are interesting issues I hope to write about in future work.
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is in the Father? Can’t we make a similar distinction between “being in” 
and “being properly in” on analogy with the PP2 definition? And if we do, 
wouldn’t it follow that the Father is not properly in the Son, and the Son is 
not properly in the Father?
In short, yes, these definitions are available and they do have these con-
sequences. I do not agree that this undermines our aims, however. Claims 
of “being properly in” were not the perichoretic claims to be modeled. 
Moreover, we should not affirm that the Father is properly contained in the 
Son, nor vice versa, precisely because we do not have the requisite supple-
mentation intuition regarding the Trinity—there is no “remainder” of the 
Father without the Son, nor is there any “remainder” of the Son without 
the Spirit, etc.63 Mutual indwelling, on the mereological model, allows for 
parthood among distinct individuals without division or remainder.
IV. A Disanalogy: Distinctness and Separability
As a model, I think the mereological conception of perichoresis can do 
some important philosophical and theological work. However, as with 
any model, there will be disanalogies. In this section I discuss one par-
ticular disanalogy between the motivating examples (e.g., the statue and 
the clay) and mutual indwelling of the divine persons related to the unity 
of the Trinity. I conclude by considering some ways of accounting for this 
unity, including modal inseparability and constitution.
The key disanalogy concerns the whether the persons of the Trinity 
are separable, i.e., whether any of the persons can exist without any of the 
others. Augustine thought this inseparability was a straightforward con-
sequence of simplicity: “It is for this reason then that the nature of the 
Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose.”64 
Even in the earliest uses of person-perichoresis for the doctrine of the 
Trinity, the persons were thought to be inseparable.
The abiding and resting of the Persons in one another is not in such a man-
ner that they coalesce of become confused, but, rather, so that they adhere to 
one another, for they are without interval between them and inseparable.65
Now, there are a number of different kinds of inseparability: it may be 
humanly impossible to separate two magnets of a certain strength, or it 
may be physically impossible to separate time and space, or it might be 
metaphysically impossible to separate the triangular from the trilateral, or 
63If one really wanted to insist that proper indwelling is the correct perichoretic notion, 
there are at least two avenues to capture that thought. First, one could simply opt for the 
PP1 notion of proper parthood, and would then have to reject transitivity and supplementa-
tion (which shouldn’t hold in the case of the persons of the Trinity anyway). Second, one 
could follow Cotnoir and Bacon (“Non-Wellfounded Mereology”) and axiomatize proper 
parthood directly as merely a transitive relation. On this route, only Strong Supplementation 
can be maintained, and entities can be proper parts of themselves.
64Augustine, City of God, Bk. 10, 319.
65Damascene, The Orthodox Faith, I.14.11–18.
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logically impossible to separate the truth of a proposition from the truth 
of its double-negation. The key question for separability is this: to what 
extent is it possible (on some understanding of the relevant modality) for 
one to exist without the other?
The persons of the Trinity, as co-eternal, are temporally inseparable; 
similarly, as metaphysically necessary they are metaphysically insepa-
rable. By contrast, the statue and clay are clearly separable: one can exist 
without the other. The clay is typically made before a statue. There might 
be worlds like ours in which the very same clay exists but no statue was 
made, or worlds very similar to ours in which that particular portion of 
clay didn’t exist and so the same statue was made from a different portion. 
As a result, the three persons of the Trinity are more strongly united than 
the statue and the clay, and hence mutual parthood is not sufficient to 
account for this unity.
This is something of a drawback for the model, as perichoresis is typi-
cally intended to function as a means of uniting the persons of the Trinity. 
Of course, one can accept the metaphysical impossibility of their separa-
bility, by dint of their necessary existence. But this inseparability is not due 
to perichoresis; their unity is not explained by mutual indwelling.
There are some kinds of unity that can be accounted for by parthood, as 
parthood is a significantly intimate relation. Sider outlines two key ways 
in which that intimacy shows up.66
Inheritance of Location: If x is part of y, then y is located wherever x is 
located.
Inheritance of Intrinsicality: If property P is intrinsic, then the property 
having a part that has P is also intrinsic.
The Inheritance of Location entails mutual parts will have to be co-located; 
and this corresponds to a robust notion of spatial inseparability. Of course 
this only holds for parts that have locations, and I’ve already questioned 
whether this is appropriate for the divine persons in §I. The Inheritance 
of Intrinsicality entails every intrinsic property of a part (“P”) will cor-
respond to an intrinsic property of the whole (“having a part that has P”), 
and for mutual parts vice versa. The import of this inheritance principle 
for the divine persons is that the intrinsic properties of each person of the 
Trinity (e.g., “being begotten”) correspond to some other property (e.g., 
“being such that the begotten dwells within me”) intrinsic to every other 
person of the Trinity.
While these notions of intimacy and unity may well be philosophically 
and theologically important; it should be clear enough that they cannot 
carry the whole weight of the unity of the Trinity.
66Sider, “Parthood,” 70. See also Gilmore (“Sider, the Inheritance of Intrinsicality, and 
Theories of Composition”) for discussion.
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Constitution and Separability
There is at least one other sense in which mutual parts are united that 
is worth highlighting: in the usual material examples, mutual parts are 
united by being made of the same matter.
One of the main rivals to the mutual parthood view makes heavy use 
of this shared matter: it’s the view that the statue is constituted by the clay. 
Many, following Aristotle, hold to a hylomorphic view of material objects 
such that the matter (e.g., the clay) is part of the whole (e.g., the statue), 
though not vice versa.67 Such a view accepts the numerical distinctness of 
the statue and the clay, but they do not typically accept anti-extensional-
ism.68 That is because hylomorphic views generally accept that there are 
parts (or perhaps “constituents”) of the statue, namely its form, that distin-
guish it from the clay.
To be clear, this is not the view I am defending here. I do not accept 
that there are formal parts (or constituents) that serve to mereologically 
distinguish the statue and the clay; they are distinguished by their proper-
ties and properties are not parts. Nor do I here undertake a commitment 
to a basic metaphysical relation of constitution that holds asymmetrically 
between the statue and the clay. The constitution view of material objects 
has been put forth (by Brower and Rea) as a model of the metaphysics 
of the Trinity.69 Imagine a clay statue is used as a pillar in a cathedral. 
Just as the statue and pillar are numerically distinct but made of the same 
material stuff (the clay), so too can the Father, the Son, and the Spirit be 
numerically distinct but made up of the same immaterial stuff (the divine 
essence). But just as the statue and the pillar are (in some sense or other) 
“the same material object,” so too are the Father, Son, and Spirit “the same 
immaterial object.” Instructive as it may be, the constitution view of the 
Trinity has faced a number of criticisms.70
From the perspective of the aims of this paper, it is not immediately ob-
vious how the constitution model can make sense of mutual indwelling. 
Though the persons are the “same” in an important sense, there is no 
clear sense in which they are “in” one another. One potential avenue is 
as follows: one could make use of a predicational concept of “being in,” 
in particular the relation of instantiation. Each person of the Trinity in-
stantiates the divine essence, and hence this essence is “present in” each 
person. By itself, this doesn’t quite deliver mutual indwelling between the 
67See Fine, “Coincidence and Form”; Haslanger, “Parts, Compounds, and Substantial 
Unity”; Koslicki, The Structure of Objects; and Rea, “Sameness without Identity” and “Hylo-
morphism Reconditioned.”
68Some theorists accept a constitution relation without understanding constituting matter 
as a part. See, e.g., Baker, “Why Constitution is not Identity” and “Unity without Identity.”
69Brower and Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity.” See also Hasker, Metaphysics 
and the Tri-Personal God, ch. 28, for a somewhat different constitution model.
70See Craig, “Does the Problem of Material Constitution Illuminate the Doctrine of the 
Trinity?”; Hasker, “Constitution and the Trinity”; and Tuggy, “Constitution Trinitarianism.”
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persons, but only a shared essence. To supplement, one might suggest a 
kind of systematic ambiguity thesis: so when Jesus says “I am in the Fa-
ther and my Father is in me” what is meant is that “I [my essence] is in the 
Father [the person] and the Father [his essence] is in me [the person].” This 
delivers an interpretation of the target perichoretic claims, but seems to 
me to be something of a stretch, however. Alternatively, one could accept 
(perhaps by divine simplicity) that each person is identical to the divine 
essence. If essences are still said to be “present in” the persons they are 
identical to, this would deliver the truth of the perichoretic claims. In this 
case, though one wonders how material constitution sheds any light on 
the underlying metaphysics.
While I think Brower and Rea are right to look for some kind of same-
ness without identity, I do not think constitution is the right sort of notion. 
Sameness of matter (or “immaterial stuff”) is not sufficient for two things 
to count as the same material object, because it is not sufficient for in-
separability. The statue and the pillar are clearly separable: one can exist 
without the other temporally and modally, even though they are consti-
tuted by the same matter. The statue might be removed from the plinth in 
the cathedral and placed in a museum, thus ceasing to be a pillar whilst 
remaining a statue. Or, the sculptor might be unhappy with the shape of 
statue, and so take it down and reform the very same clay into a purely 
cylindrical pillar, whereby the statue ceases to exist. It seems natural to 
think that the degree to which one can exist without the other informs our 
judgements about whether one thing is the same object as another. So in 
what sense do they count as the same material object?71 In sum, neither 
constitution nor mutual parthood is sufficient to account for this deep 
metaphysical unity.
It is worth contrasting the aims of this paper with the aims of Brower 
and Rea. They set out to provide a metaphysically perspicuous model of 
“sameness without identity” to help explain how the three persons of the 
Trinity can be one God. My aims were much more modest; I didn’t set out 
to solve all philosophical difficulties with the doctrine of the the Trinity. I 
merely wished to solve the puzzle as to how any reasonable conception of 
being in could allow us to make sense of mutual indwelling. In my view, 
Brower and Rea are right that the puzzles of material constitution can 
illuminate the Trinity, but not in the way that they suppose.
Unity and Oneness
I still have not delivered a fully adequate model of divine unity; and as 
a result, we have not given a full account of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
We should not rest content with a mere “social” model of three persons 
that mutually indwell one another; critics of social trinitarianism appear 
71Of course this sort of coming-into and going-out-of existence is impossible with the 
Father, Son, and Spirit as they are (arguably) necessary existents. But that can’t be the whole 
story of their unity; after all, we do not think of, say, the number 3 and the Father as united 
simply because they are both necessary existents.
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to be right that perichoresis alone cannot account for the unity of the three 
persons. The doctrine of the Trinity requires us to make sense of a deep 
metaphysical oneness of God. After all, almost immediately after Jesus ex-
presses his mutual indwelling with the Father, he claims “I and the Father 
are one” (John 10:30). In the words of Augustine:
There are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and each is God and at the 
same time all are one God; and each of them is a full substance, and at the 
same time all are one substance.72
I have been assuming throughout that the persons of the Trinity are dis-
tinct, i.e., non-identical. This is in part because Trinitarian monotheism 
requires one to affirm that there are three divine persons. But it also follows 
from the Indiscernibility of Identicals: there are truths about each person 
that are not true of the others. So we cannot, I think, ensure the oneness of 
the persons by identity.
What is required, then, is a metaphysics of unity that is not tied to qual-
itative indiscernibility. Of course, this is nothing more than a pointer in a 
certain direction. A fully worked-out model of the doctrine of the Trinity 
is a long way off. But providing a conceptually coherent model of mutual 
indwelling is a good start.73
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